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Comments
THE ATTEMPT AS A RESPONSIVE VERDICT
The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v.
Love' has focused particular attention upon the question of
whether a verdict finding a defendant guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime is responsive to a charge of the completed offense.
In holding that a verdict of attempted manslaughter was not re-
sponsive to a charge of murder, the Court also declared that the
crimes of murder and attempt to commit murder were not
generic offenses. 2 Justice Rogers avoided the provision in Article
27 of the Criminal Code that an attempt is a separate but lesser
grade of the intended crime by reasoning that "any interpreta-
tion of the code articles that would permit a person charged with
murder to be convicted of an attempt to commit the murder or an
attempt to commit manslaughter is wholly out of keeping with
the accepted notions of criminal law and procedure."3 Reliance
was also placed upon Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure4 which expressly provides that "in all trials for murder
the jury shall be instructed that they may find the accused guilty
of manslaughter or negligent homicide." This was treated as an
exclusive enumeration of the verdicts responsive to a charge of
murder. The decision in the Love case was reaffirmed shortly
thereafter in State v. Bray,5 wherein the court held that a verdict
of attempted murder was not responsive to a charge of murder.
A third case, State v. Ferrand,6 also decided shortly after the
Love case, indicates that the principle enumerated in the later
opinion may be limited to homicide cases. In State v. Ferrand
the supreme court affirmed a verdict of attempted aggravated
rape which had been returned in response to a charge of aggra-
1. 26 So: (2d) 156 (L. 1946).
2. The court, through Justice Rogers, stated: "It is certain that murder
and attempt to commit murder are not generic offenses and the lesser is not
included in the greater. The two offenses are separate and distinct and could
not be included in the same count in one indictment." 26 So. (2d) 156, 158
(La. 1946).
3. Id. at 157.
4. La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
5. 27 So. (2d) 337 (La. 1946).




vated rape. No issue was made of the responsive nature of the
verdict and the court said: "A separate but lesser grade of the
offense of aggravated rape, and responsive to a charge for that
crime, is an attempt to commit aggravated rape."8 In so declar-
ing, the court recognized and applied the general principle that
an attempt verdict is responsive to a charge of the basic crime.
While the supreme court's actual holding in the Love case is
probably limited in scope, some of the principles announced
therein might become far reaching in their effect; a careful re-
appraisal of the issues involved is in order.9 Article 27 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code is a general provision embracing all
attempts to commit crimes. Being a part of the substantive
criminal law, it does not deal with the related procedural prob-
lem of whether a verdict of attempt is responsive to a charge of
the basic crime. It does, however, expressly provide that "an
attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime;"
and further provides that proof of the actual commission of the
offense shall not bar a prosecution for the lesser and included
inchoate offense of "attempt." These provisions indicate a legis-
lative intent, in drafting the substantive law of crimes, that an
attempt should be generic with, but a lesser grade of, the various
basic crimes defined in the other articles of the Criminal Code.
An application of Section 1053 of the Revised Statutes of
1870, which was apparently overlooked by both the court and
counsel,10 might well have sustained an attempt verdict in these
cases. That section provides,
"If, on the trial of any person charged with any crime or
misdemeanor, it shall appear to the jury upon the evidence
that the defendant did not complete the offence charged, but
that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same,
such person shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be
acquitted, but the jury shall be at liberty to return as their
verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the crime or mis-
demeanor charged, but is guilty of an attempt to commit
the same .... "1
8. Id. at 178.
9. It is well to note that the Love case was decided in April, 1946; the
decision in the Perrand case, holding an attempt responsive, was handed
down in May, 1946; and the Bray case, which held a verdict of attempted
murder not responsive to a charge of murder decided in June, 1946. Also
in the Ferrand case no issue was made of the responsiveness of the verdict
by counsel for the defense.
10. This is probably explained by the fact that Dart's Statutes list Sec-
tion 1053 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 as having been superseded.
11. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 1053.
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This statute has not been repealed by the legislature nor has
it been specifically overruled by the jurisprudence of this state.
On previous occasions the courts have recognized and applied
Section 1053. In State v. May'2 the court flatly applied Section
1053 of the Revised Statutes holding that this section justified a
verdict of assault with intent to rape where the defendant was
charged with rape. The verdict was treated as an attempt to com-
mit the crime and was held responsive. Again in State v. Madi-
son's the defendant was charged with robbery and found guilty
of assault with intent to rob. The court cited 1053 and found the
verdict responsive. In State v. Hearsey14 and State v. Porter5 the
court found that this particular section of the Revised Statutes
was inapplicable; but in each case its existence and validity were
noted. In one instance it was found that no crime had been
charged and in the other that no penalty was prescribed for that
particular offense.
While the above cases were decided before the adoption of
either the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Criminal Code,
there is no reason to believe that the effect or validity of Section
1053 has been altered by the adoption of these two codes. It does
not conflict with the general responsive verdict provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and is entirely consistent with the
substantive law concept of the "attempt" which is enunciated
in Article 27 of the Criminal Code. Resort to the Revised Statutes
to supplement and aid in the construction of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is expressly sanctioned by Louisiana jurisprudence.
The court in State v. McKinney 6 applied Section 992 of the Re-
vised Statutes in holding that the defendant must be served with
a copy of the indictment and the jury list; and this despite the
fact that no such requirement is found in those articles of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which safeguard the rights of the
accused.7 This interpretation, that the adoption of the 1928 Code
of Criminal Procedure did not preclude resort to provisions of
the Revised Statutes of 1870 except in case of direct conflict, was
reaffirmed a year later in State v. Brown.18 In line with this rule
of construction, the court might well rely upon Section 1053 of
12. 42 La. Ann. 82, 7 So. 60 (1890).
13. 50 La. Ann. 679, 23 So. 622 (1898).
14. 50 La. Ann. 373, 23 So. 372 (1898).
15. 48 La. Ann. 1539, 21 So. 125 (1896).
16. 171 La. 549, 131 So. 667 (1930).
17. For a criticism of this decision see Comment (1932) 6 Tulane L.
Rev. 135.
18. 172 La. 49, 138 So. 358 (1931).
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the Revised Statutes in holding that an attempt verdict is respon-
sive to a charge of the basic crime.
Prior to the adoption of the 1942 Criminal Code, very few
attempts were recognized as criminal with penalties provided;
and, consequently, there was little occasion for the application
of Section 1053. The shortcomings and inadequacies of Louisi-
ana's substantive law of attempts was noted in State v. Hearsey.1'
Judge Marr aptly described the situation saying:
"The meaning of R.S. 1053 is that, if there is a statute punish-
ing an attempt to commit a certain crime, the jury could, on
an indictment for the crime, bring in a verdict for an attempt
to commit it; but where no such statute exists, no such ver-
dict can be the basis of sentence. '20
This difficulty is overcome today by the general attempt article
of the Criminal Code, which prescribes the penalty for attempts
to commit all crimes. Thus Section 1053 assumes a new and added
importance.
Justice Rogers' general statement in State v. Love,21 that an
attempt is not generic with a charge of the completed crime, is
out of line with the jurisprudence of our sister states. It is prac-
tically the unanimous holding of the courts of other states that
a verdict of an attempt is responsive to a charge of the basic
crime. The courts in Alabama, 22 California,2 3 Georgia, 24 Indiana,2 5
Kansas, 26 Kentucky,27 Maine,28 Mississippi, 29 Nebraska,80 New
York, 81 North Carolina,8 2 Tennessee, 3 Utah,"' and West Vir-
19. Upon a charge of rape, the jury returned a verdict of assault with
attempt to commit rape. This was not found to be responsive for it found
the defendant guilty of no crime for which a penalty was prescribed. Sec-
tion 1053 of the Revised Statutes was not found to be applicable, for the
verdict was assault with intent to commit rape, not with attempt to com-
mit rape. However a clear verdict of attempt would not have been valid
for no penalty was prescribed for the crime of attempt; thus Section 1053
would still be inapplicable.
20. 2 Marr, Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana (2 ed. 1923) 1080.
21. 26 So. (2d) 156 (La. 1946).
22. Benbow v. State, 128 Ala. 1, 29 So. 553 (1901).
23. People v. Hart, 28 Cal. App. 335, 152 Pac. 947 (1915).
24. Lowe v. State, 112 Ga. 189, 37 S. E. 401 (1900).
25. Gillespie v. State, 9 Ind. 380 (1857).
26. State v. Franklin, 69 Kan. 798, 77 Pac. S88 (1904). The special statute
here covered all lesser-included offenses and attempts.
27. Young v. Commonwealth, 75 Ky. 243 (1876).
28. Petition of Carson, 39 A. (2d) 756 Me. (1944).
29. Horton v. State, 84 Miss. 473, 36 So. 1033 (1904).
30. Evers v. State, 84 Neb. 708, 121 N.W. 1005 (1909).
31. People v. Samuels, 284 N. Y. 410, 31 N. E. (2d) 753 (1940).
32. State v. Parker & Taft, 224 N. C. 524, 31 S. E. (2d) 531 (1944).
33. DeLacy v. State, 67 Tenn. 401 (1875).
34. State v. Winslow, 30 Utah 403, 85 Pac. 433 (1906).
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ginia 5 all hold an attempt responsive by virtue of special sta-
tutes similar in effect to Section 1053 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes. In Arkansas an attempt is found to be responsive under
a statute making all lesser and included offenses responsive to a
charge of the crime. The attempt is treated as such an offense. 6
Missouri has also held the attempt responsive as a lesser-included
offense. 7
Relying solely on the logic and reason of the situation it also
appears that an attempt is of the same genus as the crime charged.
All the elements of the basic crime, with the exception of com-
pletion, are found in the attempt.3 8  Thus the attempt verdict
should clearly meet the requirements of the generic and lesser-
included offense theory.
Mention is made of the fact that the victim was dead and
that it is impossible to find an attempt to kill in such a situation."
This is undoubtedly true as far as the common law view is con-
cerned, for one could not be guilty of an attempt if there was
evidence that the crime had been completed.40 Article 27 of the
Criminal Code, however, specifically states that actual commis-
sion of the basic crime does not prevent liability for the at-
tempt.4
1
It is entirely probable, in view of the Ferrand case, where
a verdict of attempted aggravated rape was upheld in response
to a charge of aggravated rape, that the Louisiana Supreme Court
will limit the rule of the Love decision to homicide cases, despite
the apparent generality of some of the language employed. This
possibility is strengthened by the fact that much reliance was
placed on Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
enumerates verdicts responsive to a murder indictment. This
article provides that in trials for murder the jury shall be in-
35. State v. Meadows, 18 W. Va. 658 (1881).
36. Pratt v. State, 51 Ark. 167 (1888).
37. State v. Frank, 103 Mo. 120 (1890).
38. For an exhaustive treatment of the generic and lesser-included
offense theories, see Comment (1944) 5 LOU'SIANA LAW REvIEw 603.
39. In the Love case the court said: "as a practical matter, a verdict
of attempted murder or of attempted manslaughter could only mean that
from the evidence the jury found that the alleged victim was still alive ....
On the other hand if the evidence disclosed that the victim was dead as a
result of the attempt to take his life, then a verdict of attempted murder
or attempted manslaughter would be justified neither in law or in logic.".
State v. Love, 26 So. (2d) 156, 158 (La. 1946).
40. See 16 C. J. 113, § 92, and authorities there cited.
41. ". . .and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a
crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted
was actually perpetrated... ." Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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structed that the accused can also be found guilty of manslaugh-
ter and of negligent homicide. In so doing the court apparently,
but without express recognition, applied the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. The decision reasons that this enu-
meration is exclusive and that other possible verdicts such as
attempts are not responsive. This maxim, while not conclusive,
is a syllogistic restatement that the courts will first look strictly
to the literal language of the statute to determine legislative
intent and has been frequently used in the construction of sta-
tutes penal in nature.4 2 Upon this basis the decision in the Love
and Bray cases can be justified as concerns homicide verdicts;
but no similar provision is controlling as to other crimes.
As a practical matter, the possibility of an attempt verdict
is of great help to the prosecution. Frequently the state does not
secure a conviction because of its failure to prove all the elements
of the completed crime. For example, in a rape case the rape may
not be proved because of a failure to show penetration, or in a
theft case the actual taking of the goods may not be fully estab-
lished. Where it is clear that the defendant at least "attempted"
to commit the crime, should not the lesser crime be a responsive
verdict just as the lesser crime of simple battery or assault is
responsive where all the elements of aggravated battery are not
established? If the same jury cannot consider the possibility of
an attempt, the result is an additional trial with the incumbent
difficulties of a conviction upon retrial.
From the Love, Bray, and Ferrand decisions several assump-
tions are possible. Looking to the actual holdings in those cases,
the conclusion may be reached that an attempt verdict is not
responsive in homicide cases, relying largely on the special pro-
visions in Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to sub-
stantiate .this view; but that an attempt will be upheld in other
cases. The Ferrand case strengthens this assumption. On the
other hand, there is much language in Justice Rogers' opinion in
the Love case which indicates that attempts are never to be con-
sidered responsive, and the Ferrand case is weakened by the
fact that the question of attempt was not put at issue by argu-
ment of counsel.
It is hoped, in the interests of trial expediency, that the first
interpretation as to the scope and meaning of these decisions
proves to be the more accurate prediction of the future course




of judicial decisions. Such a result would seem to be dictated
by the clear language of Section 1053 of the Revised Statutes of
1870, and by the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions to the effect
that an attempt is generic and a lesser-included degree of the
basic crime. GEORGE D. ERNEST, JR.
RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF AN OVERRULING DECISION
In Succession of Lambert,' the most recent Louisiana case on
the vexing problem of conjoint legacy, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana overruled certain of its prior cases on the subject.2 The
argument that a changed interpretation of the pertinent code
provisions would prejudice the property rights of those who had
relied on the overruled decisions was answered by the court with
a reiteration of the doctrine of Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manu-
facturing Company.3 The latter, while recognizing that the rule
of a case generally would be applied both retrospectively and
prospectively, announced that where vested rights had been ac-
quired in reliance upon prior decisions any case overruling the
latter would be given prospective effect only.
All systems of law recognize the necessity for some adher-
ence to judicial precedent. A clash occurs only with respect to
the weight to be accorded the authority of the decided case. The
force of judicial precedent depends upon the extent to which
each judicial system is willing to subordinate the necessity of
modification of legal rules in accordance with social and economic
changes to the desiderata of certainty and predictability in the
law.4
In the main, three distinct theories obtain as to the force of
judicial precedent.5 Under the English rule of stare decisis, a
prior case directly in point has the same force and effect upon
the court which decided it and on all inferior tribunals as a sta-
tute, unless and until overruled by a higher court. If -the prior
case was decided by the House of Lords, the point decided be-
comes the law of England, which can only be overturned legis-
latively by an act of Parliament. Judicial precedent, even of the
single case, is law de jure which all inferior courts are obliged
1. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37,997 (June 14, 1946).
2. For a treatment of the substantive law presented in the Lambert case,
see Case Note, infra p. 138.
3. 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
4. For an excellent discussion of the various aspects of this problem,
see Goodhart, Case Law in England and America (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 173.
5. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law (1934).
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